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Introduction
Charlotte Ku
Between 1990 and 1999, only one lead article on international law waspublished in the American Political Science Review. Moreover, fewerthan 10 percent of the articles published in the International Studies
Quarterly touched on a subject related to international law. In a decade when
questions of restructuring world order dominated, why has international law
not figured in the search for answers?
The short essays that follow explain why and, in doing so, they may point
the way to opportunities for political science research. The essays grew out of
a roundtable organized for the annual meeting of the American Political Sci-
ence Association in 1999. The roundtable was part of a series that the American
Society of International Law organized to address issues arising from teaching
or researching international law within the framework of political science and
international relations.
Why does work in international relations and political science, which focuses
on problems of systemwide change, compliance, and effectiveness of norms
and regulations, ignore international law? The question seems simple for an
international lawyer because these issues are at the heart of scholarship in inter-
national law. The question recently has become more compelling as those with
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principal training in law discover the value of the method and broad framework
of political science.
Yet political science seems slow to respond to the enthusiasms of lawyers,
and law has been slow to embrace the methods and techniques of political
science. Why? The essays prepared here by three prominent political scientists
and a distinguished legal research scholar try to answer this question. In doing
so, they touch on issues of mentoring, professional reward and recognition,
intellectual tradition, and the availability of data from which to conduct mean-
ingful social scientific inquiry.
Do their reflections represent a shift in the present research environment or
a continuation of the gap that exists between those who focus on international
law and those who focus on international relations? Does a gap present a barrier
to research? Do opportunities exist to overcome the gap, or will cross-
disciplinary work remain serendipitous? How can individuals interested in over-
coming these barriers do so? We hope that by understanding our differences,
individuals working in the fields of international law, international relations,
and political science will more ably learn and borrow from each other.
The concerns listed above paint a picture of a random crossover principally
to enhance an individual research project. This may be the case for the present
and so will not immediately solve the warm bodies and pipeline problem Paul
Diehl describes. Yet, as opportunities grow for global governance studies to
understand changes in norms versus power, perhaps both international lawyers
and social scientists will move just far enough away from their intellectual
traditions to join in creating new approaches to address new issues, problems,
and progress of international relations. These new endeavors may then create
the pipeline needed to provide opportunities for graduate work and research.
We hope that by understanding some of the challenges, those specializing in
international relations, political science, and international law will be able to
take advantage of the opportunities provided by our changing world. In so
doing, these specialists may break new ground in research through the informed
use of perspectives generated by multidisciplinary work as they explore the
same problems.
International Law: Stepchild
in Social Science Research
Paul F. Diehl
Although international law has long been considered one of the distinct sub-
fields of international relations, there is precious little current research on the
subject within the social sciences. This has not escaped the attention of schol-
ars. There have been repeated calls from political scientists and international
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lawyers on the need for dialogue and research that reaches across the two dis-
ciplines.1 Yet there has been more smoke than fire—and more calls for research
than actual research that responds to such pleas, even when promising lines of
inquiry are identified.2 Why are such good intentions not translated into empir-
ical research? I will outline three major problems that constitute barriers to
international legal research in political science.3 These concerns must be
addressed before any of the good ideas offered in this forum can become research
realities, lest they join earlier efforts in the orphanage of interesting but largely
ignored theoretical questions and puzzles.
Barriers to International Law Research:
The Warm Bodies Problem
The most fundamental prerequisite for international legal research by social
scientists is the availability of trained scholars to do the work. Undergraduate
student demand for international law courses is high, but there are relatively
few social science faculty specializing in the subject. For example, the typical
political science department does not have a specialist in international law,
even at major research universities. Although having a specialist in inter-
national security or international political economy is considered fundamental
for larger political science departments, the presence of an international law
specialist is not given the same priority. As is the case with most of inter-
national relations, the long-standing dominance of the realist approach was a
significant factor in this. The triumph of realism over idealism in the 1950s
(and probably before) meant that international law was deemed unimportant
and therefore not worthy of theoretical study.
Today, realism no longer holds a hammerlock on the study of international
relations. Other approaches (e.g., neoliberalism and constructivism) are per-
haps more conducive to the incorporation of international law. Yet many new
theoretical approaches are less state-centric (e.g., globalization studies, like
1Robert Beck, “International Law and International Relations: The Prospects for
Interdisciplinary Collaboration,” in Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert
Vander Lugt, eds., International Rules: Approaches from International Law and Inter-
national Relations (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3–33; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood, “International Law and
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,”
American Journal of International Law 92, No. 3 (1998), pp. 367–397.
2 For a contrasting view, see Beck et al., eds. International Rules.
3 Given the focus of the forum, I do not address the reverse problem—i.e., research
by international lawyers that is informed by political science theory and methodology.
Nevertheless, this should not imply that such concerns are not important nor that the
barriers are any less daunting.
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those by James Rosenau, and studies of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and transnational networks, like those by Margaret Keck and Katherine Sik-
kink), which may limit their extension to international legal decisionmaking,
still largely a state-driven process.4
Exacerbating the limited number of international legal specialists are two
characteristics of those who do exist. First, many political scientists teaching
international law in the United States and Canada regard international law as a
secondary or “teaching” expertise, and not necessarily one in which they con-
duct primary research. While this addresses curricular gaps for international
law, it does nothing to fill the research void. Second, the secular trend until the
early 1990s was that the largest cohort of international law specialists was
growing increasingly older and nearing retirement; whether this pattern has
been reversed in the last decade is uncertain.5 To some extent, the small pool of
international law specialists has been shrinking over time.
The most direct solution to the warm bodies problem is to train more spe-
cialists in international law. Yet this is something of a chicken and egg problem.
Most graduate programs (with some notable exceptions such as Georgetown)
do not offer courses or field concentrations in international law; this is largely
because they lack faculty specialists in that area. Thus graduate students who
might have an initial interest in international law do not have active mentors
with whom they might work. More important, there is little opportunity for
proselytizing, as graduate student interests often evolve according to the courses
they take and the interests of the faculty they encounter. Sending such students
to take courses in law schools addresses the issue of substantive grounding in
the subject matter. Nevertheless, law schools emphasize largely descriptive
analyses to assess the status of legal norms. Training in law schools is designed
to instill and hone legal reasoning skills, such that key principles of law can be
distilled from individual cases. Accordingly, there is often little or no concern
for the behavior of states or broad theoretical generalizations, which are the
staple of the social sciences.
Pathbreaking work by individuals can transform the study of international
relations (note the impact of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz). More com-
mon, research subjects and approaches gain prominence in the field by having
a critical mass of scholars working on key problems. The study of international
law from a social science perspective lacks such a critical mass. Perhaps the
best hope for achieving this is to stimulate scholars with related interests (e.g.,
4 James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1990); Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders:
Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1998).
5 John King Gamble, “Teaching International Law in the 1990s,” Studies in Trans-
national Legal Policy, No. 24 (1993).
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those who study the conditions for international cooperation) to direct their
attention more toward international law. Beyond this cooperation strategy, stra-
tegic partnerships between international lawyers and social scientists might
obviate some of the need to produce international law expertise within extant
graduate programs. Despite some problems, such strategic partnerships also
bring comparative advantages, including base knowledge and methodological
sophistication.
The Problem of Focus (and Its Corollaries)
It may seem tautological to say that few political science studies of inter-
national law exist because few scholars ask questions about international law as
a primary focus. Behind this explanation is the fact that most studies are not
centrally concerned with international law as a dependent variable. Very few
studies ask questions about how international law is formed or how it evolves.
With some exceptions (e.g., women’s studies), fields of study or research milieus
develop and/or are defined by reference to the dependent variable.
Unfortunately, international law usually arises only when scholars are con-
cerned with some other matter, such as cooperation in trade, state decisions to
use military force, and the like. That is, international law is considered as a
possible independent variable affecting international behavior. Too often, inter-
national law is not suitable as an independent variable. International law tradi-
tionally has evolved slowly and thereby often varies little over time; classic
social science methodology depends on variations in the independent variable
to account for variations in the dependent variable. For example, how does one
explain national decisions to engage in trade dumping at a given time when
treaty provisions against such practices have been in place for years?
A related problem is separating the impact of international law from that of
self-interest (the heart of rational choice approaches). There is a tendency to
attribute actions to utilitarian motivations rather than legal ones, even when
they both predict the same behavior. Exacerbating this problem is that because
international law is primarily consensual, it is likely there will be strong con-
vergence between utility-seeking and law-abiding behavior. The attempt to sep-
arate these is often futile (a similar problem, although not insoluble, exists for
international norms as well), and most scholars opt to focus on self-interest as
the default option. Accordingly, in the final wash, international legal consider-
ations rarely survive as purported influences on international behavior.
Scholars must focus on international law issues as the phenomena to be
explained. There are many broad questions: When do international treaties form
around a given issue? To what extent do states comply with international law?
(Such a question clearly moves international legal compliance from a predictor
to an outcome variable.) These questions might be studied profitably across a
variety of issue areas to build knowledge and promote generalizations. Further-
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more, such inquiries do not start from theoretical scratch, as they can be informed
by the plethora of works on regimes and international norms (for example),
which ask related questions or postulate similar processes for international coop-
erative behavior.
The Problem of Data
Ideally, theoretical concerns drive data collection, and most major data sets in
political science are developed in this causal sequence. Nevertheless, as a prac-
tical matter, data availability often conditions the kinds of questions asked and
the methods employed in political science; the hegemonic impact of the National
Election Study data on the field of American politics is only one, but neverthe-
less a prime example. Of course, not all international relations research is data
based—far from it. Yet the lack of data on international law and related con-
cerns inhibits research related to that subject matter. It is especially limiting
when one wishes to ask questions with law as the dependent variable and go
beyond small N case studies.
The lack of international law data partly stems from the sources of the
phenomena. Until the last twenty to forty years, much international law derived
from custom. As customary law was largely unwritten and often imprecise, it
was difficult to discern exactly what it stated and which states specifically
subscribed to it (although in theory it applied to all). Customary law formation
is also a process, something that is difficult to translate into data, which tend to
center on discrete actions at fixed points in time. Other sources of international
law, such as general principles or jus cogens, are similarly difficult to translate
into variable data.
The increasing trend toward codification of international law facilitates data-
gathering efforts in international law. Mere lists of treaties are not the equiva-
lent of data per se, but they do provide a potential starting point. The U.N.
Treaty Series is a collection of all international agreements since 1946, includ-
ing parties to the agreements, classified by topic area.6 Such a list might be
converted to data that assist answering questions about networks of interdepen-
dence in given issue areas, similarity of preferences or alignments across states,
or the likelihood of agreements between hostile states.
Although the study of international law would benefit from more and varied
data collections, two major impediments stand in the way. First, among those
most conversant in international legal study, few are oriented toward the behav-
ioral or social scientific approach or have the data-generation or analytical skills
to put together such data sets. Second, data construction presents a collective
goods problem in that the payoffs are longer term and disproportionately low
(relative to the investment) for those who put such data sets together. Further-
6 See www.un.org/Depts/Treaty.
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more, many social science funding agencies have increasingly looked askance
at providing support for large data-collection projects, even when the products
might be widely used.
Conclusion
Creating a new research milieu within international relations, or more broadly
within political science, is not an easy task. There is a tension between creating
an autonomous identity that offers innovative and interesting questions about
some phenomena and not severing ties with the rest of the discipline. Severing
ties presents a special risk (we see elements of this in certain constructivist or
feminist studies of international relations) that international law will not be
informed by broader international relations theory nor contribute itself to theory
development. Properly addressing the three problems highlighted above should
lead to the appropriate balance. Nevertheless, the interconnections among the
three problems demand a simultaneous attack, but it seems sometimes that the
solution of one is a prerequisite for the other two.
International Law: Stepchild in Political
Science Research? A Rejoinder to Paul Diehl
Beth A. Simmons
Paul Diehl has put on the table several important issues for those scholars who
are interested in the role of international law in international relations. He has
correctly identified one of the primary reasons why there is so little study of the
role of law in our subdiscipline of political science: the theoretical primacy of
realism, which has made such inquiries seem at best quaint and at worst dan-
gerous and misleading diversions along the road to understanding war and peace.
Although there are important barriers to fruitfully integrating international
law into the study of international relations, some of the problems listed by
Diehl are not serious barriers and present promising opportunities for scholars
who are interested in the role of law in international relations. For example, the
“warm bodies problem” is not a serious barrier to systematic research. Critical
mass is smaller than one might think and getting smaller all the time with the
use of the Internet.
It is not at all obvious to me that we need large numbers for this field to take
off in productive ways. Several other specialties within IR also had small num-
bers just a few years ago, and highly productive work has characterized these
specialties nonetheless. Consider, for example, international monetary rela-
tions. This was a field that seemingly required much technical training in an
area populated with scholars who sometimes displayed obvious disdain for
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political scientists, especially economists. Yet the compelling nature of the sub-
stantive problems alone has drawn political scientists to acquire the necessary
expertise.
It seems to me that the barriers are even lower for the acquisition of what-
ever legal expertise is necessary to research international law. How much “exper-
tise” is really necessary, anyway? It also seems to me that political scientists
need to know enough law to be able to understand how much it creates incen-
tives or disincentives for particular kinds of political action and policy choice.
It is not necessary to become a specialist to be able to read, absorb, and com-
petently grasp the subject matter for this purpose. At the risk of giving offense,
I submit that it is not that hard to comprehend enough law to be able to ask and
even answer questions that are interesting for the study of international relations.
Additionally, I do not think that political scientists can or should come to
the study of law through legal specialization. Most of us will study law only
because it affects in important ways something we really care about—how
wars are fought, how trade is conducted, and whether human rights are respected.
This substantive focus is not “unfortunate.” It is healthy because it provides a
concrete motive for learning about law. In my view, it is a good thing for
political scientists to come to the law, to quote Diehl, “only when scholars are
concerned with some other matter, such as cooperation in trade, state decisions
to use military force, and the like.” After all, if we come to the law as specialists
or study law for its own sake, our lectures and our research will begin to sound
like the recitations of legal doctrine that nearly killed this subfield of IR two
decades ago.
Is it a problem that many scholars have developed a teaching expertise in
international law but not a research one? My experience is that students today
do not let you easily accept this dichotomy. When teaching international law to
undergraduates, at Duke and at Berkeley, I had to deal with the skepticism that
any of this “mattered” to the conduct of foreign policy or important inter-
national outcomes that we might care about. The students simply would not let
me lecture without pressing me in some way on this point. I had to think about
it, and the more I did, the more I realized I did not know. But the more I tried
seriously to provide them answers, the more I ended up doing nascent research.
So I do not think this strict dichotomy can last long in all cases. Students are
skeptics; they no longer allow teachers simply to recite legal doctrine—not
while NATO is dropping bombs without Security Council approval, as in Kos-
ovo in 1999.
Finally, to the extent that the warm bodies are relatively few, this provides
an opportunity to do cutting-edge research. There are advantages to being in a
small pool. The fact that there are relatively few people working on explaining
the creation and evolution of international law and its effects on state behavior
raises the payoffs to those who are willing to labor in this field. If you were the
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editor of a major journal, which would you rather publish, the 197th article on
democratic peace or a careful examination of the extent of law compliance
among sovereign states?
In sum, the question is not whether we can acquire the necessary expertise.
We need not be specialists; sufficient expertise is pretty easy to acquire, and
there is a growing legal community with whom we can form strategic alliances.
The question also is not whether we can increase our ranks. This is an epiphe-
nomenon of the inherently compelling nature of the problems we are tackling.
The real question is: Can we profitably study international law as political
scientists? Here we face serious challenges.
For one thing, international law can best be thought of as an endogenous yet
consequential variable, that both needs to be explained and has an influence on
outcomes we care about. After all, governments spend time, energy, and polit-
ical resources negotiating agreements because they expect them to have some
kind of impact on outcomes. We need theories and evidence that take this endo-
geneity into account.
Second, we should be willing to theorize about international law as interest
driven. Diehl points out that there is a tendency to attribute actions to utilitarian
rather than legal motivations, even when both predict the same behavior. This is
as it should be. Interests are the default explanation in political science, and
justifiably so. In most cases, there is no point in trying to deny that interests are
the primary drivers of state behavior in IR. The challenge is to design research
that is able to address the question as to whether legal considerations have any
independent impact on states’ decisions.
Conceptually, this should not be difficult to imagine: governments volun-
tarily accept obligations that they find inconvenient to keep later. This happens
all the time, so there should be plenty of opportunity—despite the endogeneity
problem—to distinguish interest-driven behavior from behavior that flows from
a legal commitment. The key is to choose carefully cases in which short-term
interests might predict x but legal commitments predict y. Political scientists
control for things all the time; in principle, it should be no more difficult to do
so in the case of short-term interests versus longer-term legal considerations, as
long as we have political theories about what constitutes a short-term interest.
The job is not complete if we simply design controlled research that dem-
onstrates a correlation between legal requirements and state action. It is also
necessary to clarify the mechanism by which we expect international law to
influence state behavior or policy choice. The theoretical frontier is to deter-
mine why the law matters to behavior, if indeed it does. The explanation cannot
be devoid of an “interest” explanation. The most convincing explanations will
be those that give a good reason to believe that the existence of legal institu-
tions changes the interests governments have in particular kinds of behavior.
We need to think of what mechanisms could be at play in changing the context
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of choice: do legal commitments change expectations about behavior such that
violating obligations increases costs? What kinds of costs are involved: domes-
tic political punishment, market punishment, or punishment from other states
or international institutions? Under what conditions can we expect these vari-
ous mechanisms to come into play?
In conclusion, I submit that the most difficult issues are conceptual and
methodological, not data and numbers of researchers. The world is getting more
rule-intensive—more “legalized.” This is an empirical reality that is difficult to
ignore. The increasing number of transnational actors causes it, coupled with
an accelerating interdependence and globalization that makes more rules imper-
ative for greater political cooperation and proliferating economic intercourse.
Once we have framed the questions in interesting and researchable ways—
and in ways that will at least speak to the concerns of critics who see nothing
but short-term interests in every governmental policy choice—the warm bodies
will eventually come. I predict that with the number of energetic graduate and
even undergraduate students who are interested in these questions, the appro-
priate data will not be far behind.
Working with Political Scientists:
A Lawyer’s Experience
Dorinda G. Dallmeyer
Since 1991, I have served as a participant, lecturer, and twice the coorganizer
of a summer workshop on international organization, which was sponsored
jointly by the American Society of International Law (ASIL) and the Academic
Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS). This two-week workshop is
designed to bring together promising young scholars, with newly minted Ph.D.s
in international relations, who are researching areas in international law. The
hope is that in this intensive workshop experience, participants will be stimu-
lated to begin interdisciplinary cooperative research, or failing that, at least
gain an appreciation of the terms and approaches of the counterpart field.
I would like to make several points in light of my experience during the past
eight years and from these varying perspectives. Generally, it has been difficult
to achieve numerical parity between representatives of international law and
international relations in selecting the two dozen participants for the summer
workshop. Each year there are far more students, both from the United States
and abroad, completing dissertations in international relations than pursuing
international law specialties. It is partly due to the greater demand for persons
to teach multitudes of students in political science, as opposed to the relatively
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limited number of students in law school. It is also partly due to the difference
in credentials expected of law faculty versus political science faculty.
The Ph.D. degree is an absolute minimum for political science faculty; the
holder of the equivalent S.J.D. is a rare bird. An unscientific survey of the
Directory of Law Teachers, published by the Association of American Law
Schools, reveals that most of the professors teaching international law—many
of the younger and most innovative writers in the area—do not hold a degree
beyond the J.D., completed after three years of study following the undergrad-
uate B.S. or B.A. degree. Compounding this difference is the fact that accred-
itation standards effectively prevent law schools from offering a J.D. in
international law. Occasionally, we find a certificate program or more com-
monly an area specialization, but that is about all; it is in keeping with the
domestic focus on law that has typified law school pedagogy, at least until
recently.
The result is a person interested in international law, perhaps marginalized
as far as the perceived centrality of the enterprise in relation to the overall focus
of the law school, and a person ensconced in a “professional” school as well.
Although it would be unfair to characterize a law school education as simply
the production of competent technicians, the approach is grounded in diagnosis
and prescription. In most instances, jurisprudence and theory is not a central
theme. If jurisprudence is taught at all, for better or worse, it is taught in a
seminar setting, ensuring that only a self-selected few will grapple with themes
of realism, etc., which are standard fare for students in international relations.
Mixing international relations graduates with international law graduates
can produce unexpected results. The general impression is that law students
behave like tiger sharks, but I have seen them rendered speechless by Ph.D.
candidates from the field of international relations. Remarks such as “Well,
I’ve listened to your presentation, and I still don’t know what your dependent
variable is” can lead to slack-jawed perplexity among the lawyers in the crowd.
Various schools of thought drilled into the international relations students through
preparation for a seemingly endless stream of qualifying examinations and tossed
off liberally as shorthand in conversation leave the lawyers gasping. More than
once there has been a note of condescension, such as, “You don’t even have a
theory. Why, you’re just describing things.” My impression also is that inter-
national law is often viewed by those outside the field as a quaint enterprise of
the striped-pants set, almost an immutable creature preserved in amber, and a
diversion from the real story of policy choice.
Yet to the international law scholar in the postwar era, there has been an
explosion of subject matter on international law in its broadest sense, including
international institutions and regimes. There also has been a more conscious
effort by legal scholars to directly address methods by which they conduct
research in international law. This movement is most admirably on view in the
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April 1999 issue of the American Journal of International Law, in which twelve
prominent legal scholars contributed to a symposium on method in inter-
national law. It included international relations as one of the methods—
although as interpreted by lawyers.
Understandably, the organizers of the symposium could not discuss all meth-
ods of approaching international law, but instead concentrated on seven: posi-
tivism, policy-oriented jurisprudence, international legal process, critical legal
studies, feminist jurisprudence, law and economics, and a purposefully inter-
disciplinary approach combining international law and international relations.
Although by necessity the organizers asked the contributors to focus on one
distinct topic rather than the gamut of applications, the resulting case studies
produced valuable insights on how methods differ in their approach and effi-
cacy. As a result, we now can point to this comparative work to indicate the
multitude of methods available for analysis not only by international law schol-
ars, but also by international relations specialists.
In much interdisciplinary work, it is difficult to create a jargon-free zone
unless it is pursued consciously from the start. An example of this problem is
the different meanings the two groups attribute to the word “norm.” One tactic
is to start with an examination of papers that presents comparative research
strategies and encourages questions about terminology. For some groups in the
workshop experience, the differences between the disciplinary approaches have
been major problems; other groups have cleared the hurdle quickly and were
astonished to think it had been such a stumbling block for others.
As with any enterprise, a long-term research relationship needs to be estab-
lished. The intensive, sometimes “boot camp” atmosphere of the workshops
can lead to rapid development of informal working groups who share common
subject matter interests—e.g., environmental regimes, postconflict peace build-
ing. Several self-selected research groups that formed around common core
interests during the workshop have succeeded in getting financial support from
foundations to continue their collaboration.
A recent development for international law scholars, which also should make
international law research more appealing to political scientists, is the rapid
increase in the availability of international documents online. In the past five
years, we have benefited from a revolution in timely access to documentation
that formerly took months and sometimes years to appear.
Collaboration is a delicate relationship, regardless of the subject matter area
and the ease of access to information. Cross-disciplinary collaboration contin-
ues to be rare. Yet it offers the opportunity for each party to return to inter-
national law or international relations and apply the insights learned from the
disciplinary detour. I believe we are seeing the greatest impact among the par-
ticipants in the ASIL/ACUNS workshops in more reflective analysis within the
subject matter of international law.
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Doing Collaborative Research on International
Legal Topics: An Autobiographical Account
Harold K. Jacobson
This is an account of my complicated relationship with international law. I beg
the readers’ indulgence for my reminiscences in the hope that they encompass
a story of broader import. The story is one of rejection, abandonment, redis-
covery, and efforts to achieve rapprochement. Given international law’s role as
a parent of modern international relations studies, the account bears an undeni-
able relationship to family life cycles.
Rejecting International Law
I entered the graduate program in international relations at Yale University in
September 1950 and left as a freshly minted Ph.D. in June 1955. After two
years at the University of Houston, I joined the University of Michigan Depart-
ment of Political Science in September 1957 and have remained a member of
the Michigan faculty since.
The 1950s and early 1960s were heady days for those studying international
relations through the lens of political science. Many of us, like many who came
before and after us, were deeply committed to our studies being relevant to
achieving peace, prosperity, and human dignity. Having absorbed both E. H.
Carr’s The Twenty Years’Crisis and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations,
we knew we had to be realistic.7 At Yale and Michigan and many other places,
we were also deeply committed to developing science. Quincy Wright’s A Study
of War provided a template for amassing data and systematically deriving gen-
eralizations and testing theories.8 We were convinced that we could be relevant,
realistic, and rigorous.
These were the early days of the behavioral revolution. We saw ourselves as
budding scientists. Following the ways of natural science, we would adhere to
the tenets of logical positivism. There was much emphasis in our graduate
training and early self-learning on gaining insights from the behavioral sci-
ences, especially psychology, sociology, and anthropology. We were taught that
our goal should be to search for generalizations about behavior in international
7 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the
Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1949); Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1949).
8 Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
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relations. We thought that we could discover laws that governed international
behavior. Although our positivist proclivities prohibited us from proclaiming it,
we hoped that the generalizations would form the basis for prescriptions.
Political scientists attempting to develop generalizations about political
behavior tended to deemphasize institutions, and international law did not fig-
ure prominently in our search for generalizations about international behavior.
Although Carr’s The Twenty Years’Crisis had a sophisticated treatment of inter-
national law, the section concluded by rejecting law and judicial settlement as
a prescription for world order.9 Carr argued that law reflected the interests of
the powerful. Because of the way it was formed, it could not easily adjust
existing rights. He counseled extricating “ourselves from the blind alley of
arbitration and judicial procedure.” 10 Morgenthau also discussed international
law in detail, but he, too, rejected law as a formula for world order.11 For
Morgenthau, the decentralized character of law, the way it was formed, adju-
dicated, and enforced, rendered it inadequate to deal with the essential issues of
war and peace.
Percy Corbett taught a course in international law at Yale. Accepting Carr’s
and Morgenthau’s arguments, I did not take it. Given my adherence to Carr’s
and Morgenthau’s perspective, military strategy by Bernard Brodie seemed more
relevant. Harold Lasswell taught in the Yale Law School, and I read his books.
They seemed like political science.
My dissertation stressed Soviet behavior in the United Nations and the clash
between the USSR and the West. There was little law in it. When I came to
Michigan, I proposed dropping law from the title of graduate and undergradu-
ate courses on international law and organization.
Rediscovering International Law
Even in the 1950s, I could not escape a nagging sense that to ignore inter-
national law was to ignore an important part of international relations. Arnold
Wolfers lectured and wrote about states’ pursuit of milieu goals, which per-
tained not to national possessions but “to the shape of the environment in which
the nation operates.” 12 He pointed out that if it were not for such goals “peace
could never become an object of national policy.” 13 He listed efforts to pro-
mote international law and establish international organizations as prominent
9 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 170–223.
10 Ibid., p. 207.
11 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 209–242.
12Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Bal-
timore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 73.
13 Ibid., p. 74.
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examples of milieu goals. In a guest lecture before Yale graduate students in
international relations, Philip C. Jessup gave a version of his ideas about trans-
national law. His approach was novel and stimulating.
This nagging sense grew as the second half of the twentieth century devel-
oped. Although Carr’s and Morgenthau’s positions may have been appropriate
for analyzing the interwar period, the post–World War II period differed con-
siderably from the period on which they based their conclusions. International
relations came to encompass much more than arguments about the control of
territory and issues of war and peace. Even traditional security and military
issues were redefined as the world contemplated the horrendous potential of
weapons of mass destruction. Economic issues became more prominent, as did
concerns with human rights. Then environmental issues were put on the inter-
national agenda.
Moreover, the project to discover universal laws governing behavior fell
short of our aspirations. We found that we could not understand and explain
behavior without including history and institutions in our analyses. When con-
fronted with similar stimuli similarly placed and endowed, actors responded
differently. We had to rediscover institutions to account for the differences, and
in the process, some of us at least rediscovered international law.
Along this route, I became engaged in four projects that involved working
collaboratively with international legal scholars. The first was a study of the
negotiations for the limited ban on testing nuclear weapons. Even if, as Carr
and Morgenthau argued, international law could not be used to solve deep polit-
ical conflicts, it could play a role in limiting the means used to pursue those
conflicts. The second was a study of the functioning of environmental institu-
tions in the decade after the Stockholm conference. The third was a study of the
extent of compliance with international environmental regulations. Both projects
were based on the sense that international regulation would be required to ame-
liorate environmental problems that transcended state borders. The fourth project
is an ongoing study of the uses of military forces under the auspices of inter-
national institutions and democratic accountability. Despite Morgenthau’s skep-
ticism, military forces have been deployed under the auspices of international
institutions almost sixty times since the end of World War II. Collective secu-
rity works to a limited extent.
Can democratic accountability be assured and maintained when military
forces are deployed under the auspices of international institutions? The second
and fourth projects were conducted under the auspices of ASIL. The first project
was a two-person collaboration between a political scientist and an inter-
national legal scholar. The three other projects each involved a large number of
participants, several of whom were international legal scholars. These four expe-
riences provided stimulating challenges and rich and rewarding opportunities.
Membership on the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International
Law has helped me put these experiences in a broader perspective.
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Seeking a Rapprochement: Challenges in Exploring
International Law
Since I was not trained in international law, I have felt that I could work only on
issues that involved international law as a central component in collaboration
with someone trained in international law. Finding a collaborator is difficult.
International law and the study of international relations within political sci-
ence have become separate disciplines. Each has its own jargon, epistemology,
and methods. Both international lawyers and political scientists have their own
career incentives. To collaborate risks moving one or the other side out of the
framework that will provide career rewards.
I have been very fortunate. Eric Stein and I studied the limited test ban
negotiations together.14 He was initially trained at Charles University and then
at the University of Michigan. He served in the Department of State and rep-
resented the United States in the United Nations before he returned to the fac-
ulty of the University of Michigan Law School. His early training at Charles
and his experience in the Department of State made him receptive to collabo-
ration with nonlawyers. Edith Brown Weiss and I were codirectors of the project
on national compliance with international environmental accords.15 She earned
both a J.D. from Harvard and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of
California at Berkeley. David Kay, with whom I codirected the project on envi-
ronmental protection, was a political scientist, but he was also director of stud-
ies at ASIL.16 Charlotte Ku, with whom I codirect the project on using military
forces under the auspices of international institutions, received her Ph.D. from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She studied both international rela-
tions and international law, the latter under the guidance of Leo Gross, a prom-
inent international legal scholar. My collaborators have all been intellectually
open to collaboration, well prepared to engage in collaboration, and for one
reason or another not susceptible to the career risks that such collaboration
might involve.
Once appropriate collaborators are found, new challenges arise. Communi-
cating is a major challenge. International legal scholars and political scientists
who study international relations use the same words, but the meanings are
frequently different, although they may be related. For political scientists, “pos-
14 Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The
United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor: University of Mich-
igan Press, 1966).
15 Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, Engaging Countries: Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1998).
16 David A. Kay and Harold K. Jacobson, Environmental Protection: The Inter-
national Dimension (Totawa, N.J.: Allenheld Osmun, 1983).
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itivism” means an epistemology based on the fact–value distinction. For the
international legal scholars, “positivism” is a school of thought. Bruno Simma
and Andreas L. Paulus summarized the classic positivist perspective as follows:
“Law is regarded as a unified system of rules that, according to most variants,
emanate from state will. This system of rules is an ‘objective’ reality and needs
to be distinguished from law ‘as it should be.’ ” 17 The quotation shows the
similarities and differences between the two disciplines’use of the term positivist.
International legal scholars and political scientists who study international
relations frequently have different goals. We are all reformers, but lawyers are
unabashedly so. Legal scholarship, even that of positivists, often involves advo-
cacy. Political science scholarship seldom does, at least explicitly.
International legal scholars and political scientists think differently. Because
we are trained to seek generalizations, political scientists try to create models
and think in terms of establishing causal relationships through statistical analy-
ses. Lawyers are frequently skeptical of political science techniques. Because
law seeks to treat similar cases similarly, lawyers seek general solutions. Polit-
ical scientists sometimes are more inclined to seek differentiated solutions.
International legal scholars sometimes tend to think in terms of categories rather
than continua, a favorite tool for political scientists to employ in arranging data.
Finally, there is a difference that may seem trivial but it is not. International
legal scholars and political scientists differ on the desirable length of their
products. International legal scholars have a much greater tolerance for long
books.
Seeking a Rapprochement: Opportunities Opened by Exploring
International Law
Many interesting opportunities arise in researching international law with inter-
national lawyers. International legal scholars take seriously the importance of
institutions, defined broadly as Douglass North defines them: “Institutions are
the rules of the game in society, or more formally, are the humanely devised
constraints that shape human interactions.” 18 They are professionally predis-
posed to believe that law affects behavior. They base their careers on the assump-
tion that North and others are right.
International legal scholars think a lot about how institutions affect behav-
ior, and their scholarship provides a rich source of hypotheses. Suggestive exam-
ples from common wisdom found in international legal scholarship include the
17 Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, “The Responsibility of Individuals for
Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View,” American Journal of
International Law 93, No. 2 (1999), pp. 302–316.
18 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor-
mance (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3.
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following: the more precise a treaty commitment, the more likely that there will
be compliance with the commitment; hard law is better than soft law; the more
a country is involved in negotiating a treaty, the more likely it will be to comply
with the obligations set forth in the treaty; the greater the independence of the
secretariat of an international governmental organization (IGO), the stronger
the IGO will be; a single-headed secretariat will result in a stronger IGO than a
multiple-headed one; and the greater the financial autonomy of an IGO, the
stronger the IGO will be. Such hypotheses beg empirical testing, and work has
begun to test them.
There can be important synergies between international law and inter-
national relations scholarship, synergies that yield benefits for both scholarship
and policy. The negotiations that resulted in the treaty banning nuclear weapons
tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water and subsequent develop-
ments, with respect to compliance, provide an example. I learned about these
things from my study of the partial test ban negotiations and then later partici-
pated in some of the developments with respect to compliance.
During the initial phase, the test ban negotiations were driven by the tradi-
tional concept of international law and organization that there would have to be
an elaborate international organization to monitor nuclear testing and impose
sanctions if the ban on testing were violated. In January 1961, after the nego-
tiations had been in progress for several years and were stalemated, Fred Charles
Iklé, a political scientist working for the Rand Corporation, published an article
that challenged such thinking. Iklé suggested that instead of relying on a com-
plicated process of adversarial monitoring by international organizations, using
national detection systems and simply discontinuing the treaty if one side felt
that the other had violated its obligations would be sufficient. This article and
the Rand research on which it was based led to an important breakthrough in
the negotiations and paved the way to the series of arms control agreements that
were negotiated subsequently.19
The experience with these arms control agreements and other international
accords, which were negotiated to deal with environmental and other adminis-
trative issues, led to new thinking by international legal scholars about compli-
ance with international agreements. Abram and Antonia Chayes’s article, “On
Compliance,” and book, The New Sovereignty, are important examples of this
new thinking.20 The Chayes argued that while sanctions played a relatively
19 Fred Charles Iklé, “After Detection—What?” Foreign Affairs 39, No. 2 (1961),
pp. 208–220.
20 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International
Organization 47 (1993), pp. 175–206; Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1995).
20 Ku et al.
minor role in inducing compliance with international accords, management tech-
niques were more frequently the determinant. This argument provoked a coun-
terargument by political scientist George Downs and his colleagues, who argued
that the more important the agreement, the more important were sanctions.21
This exchange provoked an important debate on the role of sanctions in pro-
moting compliance with international accords. The project that I directed with
Edith Brown Weiss fits in this debate.
The Promise of Rapprochement
Anne-Marie Slaughter and others have argued that international relations schol-
ars and international legal scholars should embark on collaborative research
programs.22 They argue that there are topics that can profit from collaboration
and that the time is ripe for collaboration. I strongly support their plea. I per-
sonally have learned much from my work with international legal scholars.
This is not what I expected when I left Yale in 1955 and came to Michigan
in 1957. Were Carr and Morgenthau wrong? Was the behavioral revolution
misdirected? I think that the answer to both questions is no. Carr and Mor-
genthau were right in that international law could not have resolved the inter-
national conflicts of the interwar period. They did not fully anticipate how
international relations would develop after World War II. International law will
be enormously relevant to the broad agenda of international relations in the
twenty-first century.
We should not forget Carr’s and Morgenthau’s warnings. International law
continues to be made by the powerful, and the mechanisms for accomplishing
peaceful change internationally still fall far short of what can be done domes-
tically. As Morgenthau stressed, the enforcement process internationally con-
tinues to be decentralized, which is at the root in some respects of the Chayes–
Downs debate. We were right to try to be scientific, but our units of analysis are
not individuals but individuals organized in collectivities. We cannot ignore
institutions as North has defined them, and institutions include most impor-
tantly international law.
International relations scholars are ready to heed the call of Slaughter and
her colleagues. I hope that the journey we have traveled in the past decade has
helped to prepare us. As Slaughter and her colleagues argue, and my experience
convinces me, the benefits of collaboration will be rich.
21 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News
about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” International Organization 50,
No. 3 (1996), pp. 379– 406.
22 Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood, “International Law and International Relations
Theory.”
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Concluding Impressions
Charlotte Ku
All four essays acknowledge that opportunities for political science research in
international law exist, but that the challenges of effectively pursuing such
work need to be recognized. The writers recognize the differences between the
two fields but conclude that both political scientists and lawyers can benefit
from greater familiarity with the work of the other.
It is important that lawyers and social scientists recognize that their goals
influence their methods and that their goals differ. A lawyer is generally more
prescriptive than a social scientist and is interested in changing behavior. A
social scientist eschews prescription and seeks to understand behavior but not
to change it. A lawyer wants to understand enough about behavior to achieve
certain goals. A social scientist wants to understand behavior, whether or not
the study produces any immediate policy or practical effects.
This contrast sets up a basic incompatibility. The lawyer wants to know
how something can be achieved. The social scientist wants to understand some
element of behavior. The lawyer looks at individual instances and collects “evi-
dence,” often through descriptions of behavior or anecdotes. The social scien-
tist will look for research questions where there are sufficient data to analyze.
Whether a question can be researched or not is basic to a social scientist. Law-
yers are problem solvers who identify issues and find valid purpose in address-
ing those issues, no matter how much information is available. Dorinda
Dallmeyer’s and Harold Jacobson’s personal experiences illustrate the basic
intellectual differences that exist between law and social science.
But there are changes that signal opportunities for working more closely
together. International law is moving away from a states-only system toward
one that includes a variety of actors and a continuum of law, ranging from
treaties to informal agreements.23 Neither all actors nor all legal instruments
carry the same weight, but evidence is mounting that there is an ongoing inter-
play of modalities that influence international relations. These modalities include
those that we have traditionally studied as individual rather than related units,
such as international politics, institutions, and instruments, together with domes-
tic politics, institutions, and laws. This recognition is leading to such collabo-
rative undertakings as a project led by former American Political Science
Association president Robert Keohane “to examine the boundary between pol-
23 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It
(Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1994); Christine Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft
Law: Development and Change in International Law,” International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 38 (1989), pp. 850–866.
22 Ku et al.
itics and law to understand what processes lead to the legalization of disputes
management and what processes push toward political mechanisms.” 24
International law may be information rich, but it may not appear to be data
rich to a social scientist. Beth Simmons provides general guidance on how to
take the information provided by international law and generate analyzable
data. Work such as hers, if made accessible to international lawyers, can enhance
the debate over whether international law is observed most of the time, as Louis
Henkin asserts,25 and provide a much richer pool of evidence from which to
assess effectiveness of an international law or rule. While we are increasingly
struck by the inadequacies of the traditional elements of law and power to
understand the phenomena we witness in newspaper headlines, our disciplinary
and intellectual boundaries seem harder to overcome. As these essays suggest,
the differences are valuable and important to maintain. Nevertheless, new prob-
lems might benefit from new tools—tools that might be forged from collabo-
ration between lawyers and social scientists for better understanding of the
many perspectives of conflict and cooperation in the world today. The authors
in this roundtable have given the benefit of their experience and insight. They
acknowledge difficulty and difference but urge continuation of the effort. Col-
lectively, we hope readers of these essays will agree and answer our call.
24 Peter A. Gourevitch, “Robert O. Keohane: The Study of International Relations,”
PS: Political Science and Politics 32, No. 4 (1999), p. 626.
25Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
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